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Quantum key distribution establishes a secret string of bits between two distant parties. Of
concern in weak laser pulse schemes is the especially strong photon number splitting attack by an
eavesdropper, but the decoy state method can detect this attack with current technology, yielding a
high rate of secret bits. In this Letter, we develop rigorous security statements in the case of finite
statistics with only a few decoy states, and we present the results of simulations of an experimental
setup of a decoy state protocol that can be simply realized with current technology.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Introduction. Tasks can be performed with quantum
information processing that are difficult or impossible
by purely classical means. Quantum key distribution
(QKD) establishes secret keys shared between separated
parties to enable secure communication, by making use
of a quantum channel and a public authenticated clas-
sical channel. In the BB84 QKD protocol [1] random
bits are encoded into polarized single-photon signals sent
between the two parties (traditionally named Alice and
Bob); a rigorous upper bound on the information gain
of any potential eavesdropper (Eve) is deduced by mea-
suring the bit error rate (BER) of the quantum signals.
This information is then erased by privacy amplification
[2, 3] via public communications between Alice and Bob
over the classical channel with universal hashing [4, 5],
producing a shared secret cryptographic key. However,
in practice, QKD is popularly implemented with highly-
attenuated weak laser pulse quantum signals, which are
characterized by a Poissonian photon number probabil-
ity distribution with mean µ < 1. Thus, with proba-
bility 1 − e−µ(1 + µ) ∼ O(µ2/2), Alice prepares a pulse
containing more than one photon. Furthermore, there
is typically considerable loss in the Alice-Bob quantum
channel, amounting to a 10-20 dB attenuation in many
experiments. An eavesdropper could hypothetically ex-
ploit this loss, in conjunction with the multi-photon sig-
nals [6], with very strong attacks such as photon number
splitting (PNS) [7], to gain information on the final key,
unless µ is chosen to be sufficiently small. However, the
recent invention of the decoy state method [8, 9] pro-
vides a rigorous means to foil this class of attacks with
µ ∼ O(1), elevating the security of weak laser pulse QKD.
In a PNS attack Eve performs a photon number non-
demolition measurement to identify Alice’s multi-photon
signals. Eve removes one photon from each multi-photon
signal and stores it in a quantum memory, while sending
on the signal’s remaining photons to Bob over a lower-
loss quantum channel. Eve also blocks enough of Alice’s
single-photon signals so that Bob does not notice any
change in bit rate. Then, when the measurement bases
are revealed during the sifting stage of the BB84 protocol
Eve could obtain complete knowledge of the stored pho-
tons without introducing any statistical disturbance in
the Alice-Bob quantum communications [10]. With suf-
ficient loss in the Alice-Bob quantum channel, Eve could
block all of Alice’s single-photon signals and learn the en-
tire key. However, decoy state protocols allow Alice and
Bob to thwart the hypothetical PNS attack, and other
attacks exploiting channel loss and multi-photon signals,
on weak laser pulse QKD by enabling them to establish
a lower bound on the fraction of bits in the sifted key
that originated from Alice as single-photon signals. Pri-
vacy amplification may then be used to obtain a secret
key, making the conservative assumption that all multi-
photon signals are known to Eve.
In a decoy state protocol, Alice randomly selects the
mean photon number of each of her pulses from among a
set of values between µlow and µhigh. Each pulse encodes
a random bit in a random basis of an orthogonal space
(such as polarization or phase). Alice and Bob (publicly)
count the number of detection events (clicks signifying
that one or more photons were received) for each level.
If “too many” detections occur at the high levels and “too
few” at the low levels, Alice and Bob may suspect they
are victims of a photon number splitting attack. This is
made rigorous and shown to be asymptotically efficient
in [9]. Some approaches towards developing a practical
protocol are presented in [11, 12].
The main result of this paper is a security statement
and protocol for the decoy state method for the case of fi-
nite samples; it could be incorporated into an experiment
to get a real-world security measure for a finite-length fi-
nal secret key. Our approach [13] is to develop security
statements of the form, “With confidence 1−ǫ, Eve’s dis-
tribution over final m-bit keys has Shannon entropy at
least m − 1.” That is, the a priori probability that Eve
has less than m− 1 bits of Shannon entropy for the final
key shared by Alice and Bob is less than ǫ. However, the
security statement we present here will be limited to the
number of bits Alice and Bob share from single-photon
pulses. A complete security statement could then be con-
structed by integrating the steps of error reconciliation,
privacy amplification, authentication, and key verifica-
tion with appropriate confidence levels.
2Analysis. A signal from Alice with mean photon
number µ is detected by Bob with probability dµ =∑
n≥0
e−µµn
n! yn, where the unknowns {yn} represent the
channel transmission characteristics, with 0 ≤ yn ≤ 1.
More precisely, yn is the conditional probability that at
least one photon is detected given that n photons were
emitted. Now suppose that Alice utilizesM mean photon
numbers, µ1, µ2, ..., µM . For each µj , Alice’s detection
data (from a beam monitor) provides not only a maxi-
mum likelihood estimator µˆj , but also, more importantly
for our purposes, a 1− ǫ confidence interval
X−j ≤ µj ≤ X
+
j . (1)
Similarly, for each µj , Bob’s detection data yields a 1− ǫ
confidence interval for dµj . By truncating the infinite
series of dµj after (K+1) terms, with bounds for the
dropped portion, we obtain 2M inequalities of the form
Y −j ≤
∑
0≤k≤K
e−µj (µj)
k
k!
yk ≤ Y
+
j . (2)
We choose K sufficiently large to achieve tight bounds
(limited only by computational power). We want to con-
servatively bound the unknowns {µj}j≤M and {yk}k≤K
utilizing these 4M inequalities and the 2(K + 1) trivial
inequalities 0 ≤ yk ≤ 1. Let the closed, bounded region
in the (M +K+1)-dimensional real vector space defined
by all 4M + 2(K + 1) inequalities be denoted R. Note
that the parameters of interest {µj}j≤M ,{yk}k≤K lie in
R with confidence (1− ǫ)2M . The conditional probability
of a single photon detection conditioned on a detection
at Bob for a fixed mean photon number is
P (µ, y0, y1, ...) =
e−µµy1∑
n≥0
e−µµn
n! yn
. (3)
Let Pmin be the minimal value of P over R. Given
Pmin we could find the largest s such that Prob(number
of received single-photon pulses ≤ s|Pmin) ≤ ǫ. The fi-
nal result is that in the set of all Bob’s detections, at
least s detections came from single-photon pulses with
confidence (1− ǫ)2M+1. However finding the global min-
imum of a nonlinear function like P over a complicated
region like R is difficult. Instead we use a more conser-
vative value P ′min ≤ Pmin to calculate s. We use the
lower bounds for µ and y1 for the numerator of P and we
use upper bounds for µ and all yn in the denominator of
P . Plugging all these values into P yields P ′min and we
then use P ′min to calculate s, the bound on single-photon
detections with confidence (1− ǫ)2M+1.
In the process of incorporating this analysis in a full
protocol [13], we would also need to determine the bit
error rate for the sifted single photons. Let bn be the
BER for an n-photon pulse prepared by Alice. If every
laser pulse is well-defined in polarization, then we could
bound the single-photon BER b1 by calculating upper
and lower bounds (with confidence level 1 − ǫ) of the
observed BER Bj = e
−µj
∑
n
(µj)
n
n! bnyn for each signal
strength µj and solve for the largest possible value of b1.
Protocol of possible implementation. For purposes
of illustration, let us consider an example protocol that
is well-suited for a free-space QKD scenario. The decoy
state method works by Alice sending signals at various
strengths and Bob counting detector clicks. However,
it is possible to obtain good bounds on the transmission
rates of single-photon signals versus multi-photon signals
with a fixed, known laser strength µ, provided that Al-
ice can fire any number of her lasers simultaneously. In
the following protocol, we consider Alice’s setup to con-
tain four identical lasers, each producing a weak coherent
pulse with a distinct polarization (e.g., vertical, horizon-
tal, diagonal, and anti-diagonal). An important assump-
tion we make is that the output of j lasers firing simul-
taneously with intensity µ (averaged over all j-tuples) is
indistinguishable from the output of one laser firing with
intensity jµ (averaged over polarizations), because they
are described by the same density matrix [14].
Let ǫ be a user-defined parameter for security.
Let N be the number of clock cycles during the quan-
tum transmission portion of a QKD session.
During each clock cycle, Alice generates four random
bits. Each bit is assigned to one of the four lasers, and
each laser is fired (simultaneously) if its bit value is one.
Let Nj be the number of signal pulses sent during the
session with j lasers firing simultaneously. We thus ex-
pectN0 ≈
N
16 , N1 ≈
N
4 , N2 ≈
3N
8 , N3 ≈
N
4 , andN4 ≈
N
16 .
Bob records all positive detection results (meaning one
or more detectors click) for the N clock cycles. He in-
forms Alice (over an authenticated public channel) which
signals yielded positive detections, and then Alice tells
Bob how many lasers were fired for each detected signal.
Let Cj be the total number of positive detections
recorded for the set of signals produced by j lasers firing
simultaneously.
Let yn be the true conditional transmission proba-
bility of an n-photon pulse (i.e. the probability that
Bob observes a click when Alice prepares an n-photon
pulse). Note that y0 is the detector noise rate (back-
ground counts plus dark counts).
Let Yj be the true conditional transmission probability
of a pulse with strength µj (i.e. the probability that Bob
observes a click when Alice fires j lasers simultaneously).
Then Yj = e
−µj
∑∞
n=0
(µj)
n
n! yn. Lo et al [9] use
Cj
Nj
as a
maximum likelihood estimator for Yj , but we will instead
consider confidence levels from finite sample statistics.
Let Y +j and Y
−
j be upper and lower bounds on Yj
at confidence level 1 − ǫ, given that Bob observes Cj
detections forNj signals. The values of Y
±
j are calculated
by solving
(
Nj
Cj
)
(Y ±j )
Cj (1 − Y ±j )
Nj−Cj ≤ ǫ.
Let K to be the number of variables we will constrain.
For this example, we found K = 11 to be sufficient.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Rate of received single-photon
signals versus mean photon number µ over a channel
acting as a beamsplitter with transmission η = 10−1
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Rate of received single-photon
signals versus mean photon number µ over a channel
acting as a beamsplitter with transmission η = 10−2
Now solve for the minimum value of y1 subject to 0 ≤
yk ≤ 1 and the following set of inequalities:
Y +j ≥ e
−µj
K∑
k=0
yk
(µj)
k
k!
(4)
(1− Y −j ) ≥ e
−µj
K∑
k=0
(1− yk)
(µj)
k
k!
(5)
These inequalities are a set of hyperplanes which define
the faces of a convex polytope.
Finally, to determine the single-photon bit error rate,
let bn be the true BER of an n-photon pulse. For this
protocol, only the N1 signals prepared by Alice by firing
exactly one laser have definite polarization. Therefore,
we only have one signal strength µ1 = µ that can be
used to measure the BER in this setup, so a conservative
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Rate of received single-photon
signals versus mean photon number µ over a channel
acting as a beamsplitter with transmission η = 10−3
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Rate of received single-photon
signals versus mean photon number µ over a channel
acting as a beamsplitter with transmission η = 10−4
approach would be to let bn = 0 for n ≥ 2. This leads
to the constraint that B−1 ≤ e
−µ
(
1
2y0 + µb1y1
)
≤ B+1 ,
where B+1 and B
−
1 are upper and lower bounds with con-
fidence 1− ǫ on the observed BER of the N1 signals.
Numerical results. Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 plot the re-
sults of simulations of the protocol just described, with
observed transmission efficiency η ranging from 10−1
down to 10−4. We chose security parameter ǫ = 10−7
and detector dark count (plus background count) rate
y0 = 3 × 10
−6 per clock cycle. This value of y0 is com-
parable to the observed rate at nighttime for the 10-km
free-space experiment with clock rate of 1 MHz [15].
The optimal mean photon numbers are found to be
around 0.35, 0.45, and 0.52 for session size N = 105/η,
N = 106/η, and N = 107/η, respectively. Asymptoti-
cally, this protocol has optimal µ ∼ 0.55, which can be
compared to the asymptotic result of µ ∼ 0.5 calculated
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Rate comparison before error
correction and privacy amplification of decoy state
method (solid red line) versus conventional method
(dashed blue line) of handling PNS attack.
by Lo et al [9] with similar parameters.
We require Nη >∼ 10
5 to have sufficient statistics for
our confidence level of 1 − 10−7. However, reducing ǫ
to, say, 10−14 has minor effects; the lower bounds of the
single-photon rates are decreased for N = 105/η by less
than 25% and for N = 106/η by less than 10%.
Increasing the dark count (plus background count) rate
by a factor of ten has negligible effects on the resulting
lower bounds for the single-photon rate. We also exam-
ined the impact of BER on the resulting secret key bit
rate under this protocol. We found that, roughly speak-
ing, a BER of 7% assuming optimal individual attacks
[16] or a BER of 3% allowing general coherent attacks
[17] both resulted in halving the secret bit rate and shift-
ing the optimal µ downwards by about a quarter. Most
of this shift is due to the conservative estimation of the
single-photon BER b1 by setting bn = 0 for n ≥ 2.
Rate comparison. Conventionally [18], the PNS attack
is handled by choosing an appropriately small value for
mean photon number µ, so that even if all multi-photon
pulses are transmitted perfectly (yn = 1 for n ≥ 2), some
single-photon pulses must still remain in the set of Bob’s
detections. Then, the guaranteed single-photon rate is
close to R = µ(η − µ/2), which is maximized when we
choose µ = η. In Fig. 5, the dashed blue line corresponds
to this rate as a function of η.
Suppose we implement the decoy state protocol for a
session size of N = 109 pulses. The single-photon rate is
given by R = (1/4)fµe−µη, where f is the fraction of the
lower bound to the upper bound in Figs. 1–4, and the
optimal value of µ ranges from around 0.55 for η = 0.1
down to about 0.35 for η = 0.0001. In Fig. 5, the solid
red line corresponds to the rate with these values.
Conclusions. The decoy state method can be im-
plemented with current technology, and it greatly en-
hances the practical security of quantum key distribu-
tion. In particular, photon number splitting attacks,
where Eve has active control of the quantum channel,
can be thwarted without drastically reducing the secret
bit rate by preparing pulses at various intensities (such as
by firing a variable number of lasers with fixed intensity).
We have shown how to incorporate confidence levels from
finite statistics into the decoy state method. Choosing
the best distribution and intensities for the set of decoy
and signal states is a huge optimization problem, which
depends on such values as channel loss, dark count and
background count rates, and acceptable security param-
eters. However, we have demonstrated that even with a
few easily constructed decoy states, high rates of secure
QKD can be established with high confidence.
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